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NOTE 
Mental States and “Misconduct”: The 
Supreme Court of Missouri Interprets an 
Important Disqualification from 
Unemployment Benefits 
Fendler v. Hudson Services, 370 S.W.3d 585 (Mo. 2012) (en banc) 
BRIAN STAIR* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Unemployment insurance has been part of America’s social and eco-
nomic tradition for several decades.
1
  A significant increase in the number of 
unemployed Americans during the Great Depression led to the passage of the 
Social Security Act of 1935, which “established a system of state and federal 
unemployment insurance laws.”
2
  Stemming from Title IX of the Social Secu-
rity Act, the Missouri Unemployment Compensation Law was enacted in 
1937
3
 and imposed on employers a duty to pay taxes (contributions), begin-
ning in January 1939, from which benefit payments would be made to quali-
fied claimants.
4
  Today, this set of unemployment insurance laws is known as 
Missouri Employment Security Law (MESL).
5
   
In 2011, over 500,000 initial unemployment claims were filed with the 
Division of Employment Security (DES), a branch of the Missouri Depart-
  
 * B.A. History, Covenant College, 2011; J.D. Candidate, University of Mis-
souri School of Law, 2014; Associate Member, Missouri Law Review, 2012-13; 
Senior Note and Comment Editor, 2013-14.  I would like to express my gratitude to 
Associate Dean Rafael Gely for providing guidance, insight, and encouragement 
throughout the writing and revision of this Note. 
 1. Anthony G. Laramore, Note, Missouri’s Unemployment Crisis: The Labor 
and Industrial Relations Commission Ignores the Missouri Supreme Court, 55 ST. 
LOUIS U. L.J. 1469, 1469 (2011). 
 2. Id. 
 3. William C. Martucci, Unemployment Compensation: The Missouri Employ-
ment Security Law – Background, in 37 MO. PRAC., EMPLOYMENT LAW & PRACTICE § 
14:1 (2011 ed.). 
 4. James R. Skain, Unemployment Compensation, in MISSOURI EMPLOYER-
EMPLOYEE LAW 4-1, 4-4 (MoBarCLE Publ’ns, 3rd ed. 2008). 
 5. MO. REV. STAT. § 288.010 (2000). 
1
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ment of Labor and Industrial Relations.
6
  During that year, more than $710 
million in unemployment insurance benefits were paid, and more than 42,000 
appeals were filed following DES determinations.
7
  In September 2012, Mis-
souri had an unemployment rate of 6.9%, and more than 25,000 initial unem-
ployment claims were filed in that month alone.
8
  Overall, nearly 80,000 peo-
ple received unemployment insurance benefits in September.
9
 
Under MESL, claimants are disqualified from receiving unemployment 
benefits if they were terminated for “misconduct” connected with their 
work.
10
  Although MESL provides a definition of what type of behavior   
constitutes “misconduct,”
11
 Missouri appellate courts review decisions     
regarding the granting and denial of unemployment benefits,
12
 and these 
courts have provided judicial interpretations of this statutory definition.  Ob-
viously, such interpretations have a practical effect on who does and does not 
qualify for and receive unemployment insurance payments.  Furthermore, the 




Fendler v. Hudson Services features the Supreme Court of Missouri’s 
first thorough discussion of section 288.030.1(23) and the Court’s decision 
illustrates a development in Missouri appellate court interpretation of the 
statute’s definition of “misconduct.”
14
  This Note describes that definitional 
development and addresses its potential effect on future disputes in which 
employers are seeking to prove that an employee’s behavior constituted mis-
conduct.  Specifically, this Note focuses on how the Supreme Court of Mis-
souri, by refusing to require a showing of “willfulness” to prove “miscon-
duct,” has further complicated the use of mental states in “misconduct” analy-
sis and potentially broadened the scope of what qualifies as statutory “mis-
conduct.”  Finally, this Note will identify a potential result of this broadened 
definition
15
 and seek to show how this “Fendler effect” relates to two very 
important, competing public policy interests. 
  
 6. MO. DEP’T OF LABOR AND INDUS. RELATIONS: 2011 ANNUAL REPORT 16 
(2011), available at http://www.labor.mo.gov/documents/2011AnnualReport.pdf. 
 7. Id. 
 8. Data and Statistics, MO. DEP’T LAB. & INDUS. REL., http://www.labor. 
mo.gov/data/ (last visited Nov. 4, 2012); see also MO. DEP’T OF LABOR & INDUS. 
RELATIONS: 2012 ANNUAL REPORT 7 (2012), available at http://www.labor.mo. 
gov/documents/2012AnnualReport.pdf. 
 9. Data and Statistics, supra note 8. 
 10. MO. REV. STAT. § 288.050.2 (Supp. 2011). 
 11. § 288.030.1(23). 
 12. § 288.210 (2000). 
 13. Laramore, supra note 1, at 1470.  
 14. 370 S.W.3d 585 (Mo. 2012) (en banc).  
 15. The practical effect will be the increased denial of unemployment benefits to 
claimants.  See infra Part V.B. 
2
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II. FACTS AND HOLDING 
The DES is the state agency that is responsible for administering the un-
employment insurance benefit and tax program.
16
  The DES collects tax con-
tributions from employers and distributes unemployment benefits to individu-
als who qualify under Missouri law.
17
  Hudson Services (Hudson) is a com-
pany that provides various property management services, including com-
mercial cleaning and security.
18
  Hudson hired Carol Fendler in 1994, and by 
2008, Fendler held the position of “operations assistant” in Hudson’s house-
keeping department.
19
   
One of Fendler’s official duties was to verify the number of hours 
worked by janitorial employees on a given shift when those workers failed to 
properly clock in and out of work.
20
  Prior to July 2008, Fendler’s supervisor 
allowed her to complete this verification by calling the janitorial employees 
and simply recording into the payroll system the total number of hours the 
employees said they worked.
21
  However, in July 2008, Pam Meister became 
Fendler’s new supervisor, and although Hudson had no written policy on how 
to complete Fendler’s duty of verification, Meister told Fendler that Fendler’s 
usual method of verification would no longer be sufficient.
22
  Instead, Meister 
instructed Fendler to record the specific times that the janitorial employees 
began and ended work on a given shift.
23
  Further, Meister informed Fendler 
that she would need to get approval from the general manager if she wanted 
to merely record the total hours worked.
24
  During 2009, Meister gave 
Fendler three warnings after Fendler failed to comply with the new required 
verification procedure; the third warning came on December 28, 2009.
25
  
Despite these formal warnings, Fendler failed to comply with the procedure 
on eleven separate occasions during the month of January, and on January 25, 
2010, Hudson terminated Fendler.
26
 
Subsequently, Fendler filed a claim for unemployment benefits with the 
DES, but in March 2010, in accordance with sections 288.030.1(23) and 
288.050.2 of the Missouri Revised Statutes, the DES denied her benefits be-
  
 16. About the Division of Employment Security, MO. DEP’T LAB. & INDUS. REL., 
http://www.labor.mo.gov/DES/about.asp (last visited Sep. 3, 2013). 
 17. Id. 
 18. Fendler, 370 S.W.3d at 587. 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. 
3
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cause it determined that she had been fired for “misconduct.”
27
  Fendler ap-
pealed and received a hearing before the appeals tribunal, at which both she 
and Meister testified.
28
  Fendler testified that she had received instructions 
regarding the new verification procedures from Meister and that she had 
failed to record the exact times.
29
  However, Fendler claimed that the reason 
she had failed to do so was because she was so familiar with the old verifica-
tion procedures under her former supervisor.
30
  Fendler also denied having 
received a third warning in late 2009, and she claimed that she was unaware 
that her failure to comply with Meister’s instructions would threaten her job, 
adding that she would have followed the instructions had she known that she 
would be fired.
31
  Meister testified that she warned Fendler on three occasions 
(including the warning in December 2009) that she needed to follow the new 
verification procedures, adding that she believed that Fendler’s continued 




Finding that Fendler had not engaged in misconduct, the tribunal re-
versed the DES’s decision to withhold unemployment benefits.
33
  Hudson 
then appealed to Missouri’s Labor and Industrial Relations Commission 
(Commission), which serves as an appeals board for unemployment insurance 
cases.
34
  Finding Meister’s testimony to be more credible than Fendler’s, the 
Commission concluded that Hudson had met its burden of proving that 
Fendler’s behavior constituted misconduct.
35
  In coming to that conclusion, 
the Commission stated that Fendler’s “repeated failure to comply with explic-
it instructions takes her conduct outside the realm of mere mistakes or poor 
work performance and into the realm of insubordination.”
36
 
Fendler next appealed to the Eastern District of the Missouri Court of 
Appeals, claiming that the Commission erred in disqualifying her from re-
ceiving unemployment insurance by finding that she had engaged in miscon-
duct connected with her work.
37
  Specifically, Fendler argued that the record 
only supported a finding that she acted negligently (not willfully) and that 
  
 27. Id.  These specific Missouri statutory provisions are discussed more fully    
in the Legal Background section of this Note.  See infra notes 59-62 and               
accompanying text. 
 28. Fendler, 370 S.W.3d at 587. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. at 588. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id.; About the Labor and Industrial Relations Commission, MO. DEP’T LAB. 
& INDUS. REL., http://labor.mo.gov/lirc/ (last visited Sep. 3, 2013). 
 35. Fendler, 370 S.W.3d at 588. 
 36. Id. (emphasis omitted). 
 37. Fendler v. Hudson Servs., No. ED 95903, 2011 WL 4790628, at *1 (Mo. 
App. E.D. Oct. 11, 2011), transferred to 370 S.W.3d 585 (Mo. 2012) (en banc).  
4
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negligent behavior cannot support a finding of misconduct.
38
  Relying heavily 
on Duncan v. Accent Marketing, LLC, the Eastern District determined that the 
Commission had erred in finding that Fendler’s actions constituted miscon-
duct, reversing the Commission’s decision and remanding “for the entry of an 
appropriate award.”
39
  In doing so, Judge Glenn Norton emphasized that a 
finding of misconduct always requires a showing of “willful intent” and de-
liberate or purposeful error (even where negligence is the basis for the finding 
of misconduct or where there is a showing of multiple violations of an em-
ployer’s policy).
40
  According to the court, the evidence was insufficient to 
conclude that Fendler deliberately or purposely failed to follow Meister’s 
instructions.
41
  However, while the case was still pending in the Eastern Dis-
trict, the Supreme Court of Missouri granted transfer of the case.
42
 
The Supreme Court disagreed with the Eastern District and affirmed the 
Commission’s determination that Fendler’s actions constituted misconduct.
43
  
Emphasizing Fendler’s admission that she would have complied with Meis-
ter’s instructions had she known that she would lose her job, the Court con-
cluded that sufficient evidence existed to establish Fendler’s conduct as de-
liberate and “willful disregard” of her employer’s instructions.
44
  However, 
the Court made it clear that a lack of willfulness does not “preclude a finding 
of misconduct,” pointing out that negligence (at a high degree or level of 
recurrence) can constitute statutory misconduct.
45
  Further, the Court explicit-
ly agreed with the Commission’s statement that Fendler’s repeated failure to 
  
 38. Fendler, 370 S.W.3d at 589. 
 39. Fendler, 2011 WL 4790628, at *2-3. 
 40. See id. at *2.  
 41. Id. at *3.  
 42. Fendler, 370 S.W.3d at 588.  The case was transferred in accordance with 
MO. CONST. art. V, § 10, which states: 
Cases pending in the court of appeals shall be transferred to the supreme court 
when any participating judge dissents from the majority opinion and certifies 
that he deems said opinion to be contrary to any previous decision of the su-
preme court or the court of appeals, or any district of the court of appeals.  
Cases pending in the court of appeals may be transferred to the supreme court 
by order of the majority of the judges of the participating district of the court 
of appeals, after opinion, or by order of the supreme court before or after opin-
ion because of the general interest or importance of a question involved in the 
case, or for the purpose of reexamining the existing law, or pursuant to su-
preme court rule.  The supreme court may finally determine all cases coming 
to it from the court of appeals, whether by certification, transfer or certiorari, 
the same as an original appeal.   
MO. CONST. art. V, § 10.  Because the case was transferred while the case was still 
pending in the Court of Appeals, the Eastern District’s opinion has not been published 
in the Southwestern Reporter (as of Sep. 3, 2013).  Until the opinion is released for 
publication in the permanent law reports, it is subject to revision or withdrawal. 
 43. Fendler, 370 S.W.3d at 591. 
 44. See id. at 590-91.  
 45. Id. at 589. 
5
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follow instructions constituted insubordination, rather than mere mistake or 
poor work performance.
46
  Therefore, the Supreme Court of Missouri held 
that the fact that Fendler knew Hudson’s rule, repeatedly failed to comply 
after formal warnings, and admitted that she would have followed the rule 
had she known that she would lose her job, established competent and sub-
stantial evidence to support the Commission’s conclusion that Fendler “en-
gaged in misconduct by repeatedly and deliberately violating a reasonable, 
known and understood work rule.”
47
   
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND 
This section will discuss both the statutory and judicial understandings 
of “misconduct” as they relate to disqualification from unemployment bene-
fits.  The first subsection will cover policy concerns, funding mechanics, and 
eligibility issues related to Missouri’s employment security statutes.  The 
subsection will also describe the statutory definition “misconduct” and pre-
sent a piece of proposed legislation that would alter that definition.  The se-
cond subsection will describe the role that Missouri courts have played in 
determining what type of behavior constitutes “misconduct” in the context of 
unemployment compensation.  Specifically, the second subsection will dis-
cuss past Missouri Court of Appeals decisions relating to “misconduct” men-
tal states and other issues that are relevant to the Fendler decision and its 
doctrinal implications. 
A. Missouri Employment Security Law 
MESL declares that “[e]conomic insecurity due to unemployment is a 
serious menace to health, morals, and welfare of the people of this state re-
sulting in a public calamity.”
48
  MESL, true to its original purpose,
49
 uses 
state police power to compel the “setting aside of unemployment reserves to 
be used for the benefit of persons unemployed through no fault of their 
own”
50
 and states that its purpose is to “promote employment security both by 
increasing opportunities for jobs through the maintenance of a system of pub-
lic employment offices and by providing for the payment of compensation to 
individuals in respect to their unemployment.”
51
  MESL is to be “liberally 
  
 46. Id. at 590. 
 47. Id. at 591.  While this precise expression of the Court’s holding seems rather 
insignificant, it is important to note that the true significance of Fendler is actually 
found in the Court’s interpretation of section 288.030.1(23). 
 48. MO. REV. STAT. § 288.020.1 (2012).  
 49. See Skain, supra note 4. 
 50. § 288.020.1.  
 51. § 288.020.2.  
6
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construed” to accomplish this purpose.
52
  More recently, the Missouri De-
partment of Labor stated that the desired effect of paying unemployment ben-
efits to qualified individuals is to help “maintain the economy of the state 




In terms of funding, DES collects tax contributions from employers 
(based on the wages that company pays) on a quarterly basis.
54
  Any benefit 
payments made to qualified insureds are generally charged against the em-
ployer’s individual account.
55
  Unemployment taxes in the state of Missouri 
are paid entirely by those employers that are liable to do so under MESL; that 
is, a company does not make deductions from its workers’ wages in order to 
make these tax payments to DES.
56
  
To be eligible for unemployment benefits, an individual must be able to 
work, available to work, and “actively and earnestly” seeking work.
57
  Fur-
ther, a claimant must register at and continue to report to an employment 
office.
58
  MESL provides additional requirements in the form of various dis-
qualifications.
59
  One of these disqualifications relates to an employee’s ter-
mination for “misconduct” connected with their work.
60
  Section 288.050.2 
states (in relevant part), “If a deputy finds that a claimant has been discharged 
for misconduct connected with the claimant’s work, such claimant shall be 
disqualified for waiting week credit and benefits . . .”
61
 
Various provisions in MESL provide some guidance in determining 
what exactly constitutes “misconduct.”  For example, section 288.030.1(23) 
defines misconduct as: (1) “an act of wanton or willful disregard of the em-
ployer’s interests”; (2) “a deliberate violation of the employer’s rules”; (3) “a 
disregard of standards of behavior which the employer has the right to expect 
of his or her employee, or”; (4) “negligence in such degree or recurrence as to 
manifest culpability, wrongful intent or evil design, or show an intentional 
and substantial disregard of the employer’s interest or of the employee’s du-
ties and obligations to the employer.”
62
  Section 288.050.3 provides a con-
crete example by stating that “[a]bsenteeism or tardiness may constitute a 
rebuttable presumption of misconduct . . . if the discharge was the result of a 
  
 52. Id.   
 53. About the Division of Employment Security, supra note 16. 
 54. See Missouri Dep’t of Emp’t Sec. Quarterly Contribution and Wage Report, 
available at http://www.labor.mo.gov/DES/Forms/4-7-AI.pdf.  
 55. About the Division of Employment Security, supra note 16; see also MO. 
REV. STAT. § 288.090.3(4) (Supp. 2011); § 288.100.1(1). 
 56. About the Division of Employment Security, supra note 16. 
 57. § 288.040.1(2).  
 58. § 288.040.1(1). 
 59. See § 288.050. 
 60. § 288.050.2 (2012). 
 61. Id. 
 62. § 288.030.1(23) (Supp. 2011). 
7
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violation of the employer’s attendance policy.”
63
  Further, depending on an 
employer’s policy, showing up to work “with a detectible amount of alcohol 
or a controlled substance” may also constitute misconduct connected with 
work.
64
  Finally, MESL has a clarifying provision stating that proving “mis-




Recent proposed legislation from Missouri’s 2012 General Assembly 
sought to redefine statutory misconduct in MESL.
66
  Missouri Senate Bill No. 
816 (SB 816) seeks to replace the current definition in section 288.030.1(23) 
with the following:  
(23) “Misconduct,” regardless of whether the misconduct occurs at the 
workplace or during working hours, includes: 
(a) Conduct or a failure to act demonstrating knowing disregard of the 
employer's interest or a knowing violation of the standards which the 
employer expects of his or her employee; 
(b) Conduct or a failure to act demonstrating carelessness or negli-
gence in such degree or recurrence as to manifest culpability, wrong-
ful intent, or a knowing disregard of the employer's interest or of the 
employee's duties and obligations to the employer; 
(c) Violation of an employer's no-call, no-show policy; chronic absen-
teeism or tardiness in violation of a known policy of the employer; or 
one or more unapproved absences following a written reprimand or 
warning relating to an unapproved absence; 
(d) A knowing violation of a state standard or regulation by an em-
ployee of an employer licensed or certified by the state, which would 
cause the employer to be sanctioned or have its license or certification 
suspended or revoked; or 
(e) A violation of an employer's rule, unless the employee can demon-
strate that: 
a. He or she did not know, and could not reasonably know, of the rules 
requirements; or 
  
 63. § 288.050.3. 
 64. § 288.045.1. 
 65. § 288.046.1. 
 66. S.B. 816, 96th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2012).  
8
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b. The rule is not lawful.
67
 
Additionally, the proposed legislation would entirely remove the provi-




B. Missouri Courts’ Decisions Regarding “Misconduct” 
MESL, the Missouri Constitution, and Missouri case law establish a 
framework for judicial review of the Commission’s decisions by providing 
the applicable standard of review, burden of proof, and statutory construction.  
Article V of the Missouri Constitution grants the courts the ability to review 
these types of administrative decisions and to determine whether those deci-
sions “are supported by competent and substantial evidence upon the whole 
record.”
69
  Also giving insight into the standard of review is section 288.210, 
which states, “The findings of the commission as to the facts, if supported by 
competent and substantial evidence and in the absence of fraud, shall be con-
clusive, and the jurisdiction of the appellate court shall be confined to ques-
tions of law.”
70
  The courts review questions of law de novo, and determining 
whether the Commission’s findings support a conclusion that the employee 
engaged in misconduct is a question of law.
71
  Although the claimant usually 
has the burden of showing that he or she is entitled to unemployment insur-
ance, the burden shifts to the employer to prove misconduct if the employer 
asserts that the claimant was terminated because of misconduct.
72
  Further, 
the employer must prove the employee’s misconduct by a preponderance of 
the evidence.
73
  Finally, in accordance with the liberal construction instruc-
tion in section 288.020, Missouri courts are to construe disqualification provi-
sions “strictly against the disallowance of benefits.”
74
  
The Missouri Court of Appeals has delivered numerous opinions regard-
ing unemployment benefits that provide guidance by expressing a legal de-
scription of “misconduct connected to work,” especially in the context of 
following the employer’s rules, standards, or instructions (the Fendler con-
  
 67. Id. 
 68. Id.  
 69. MO. CONST. art. V, § 18. 
 70. § 288.210 (2000). 
 71. Tenge v. Wash. Grp. Int’l, Inc., 333 S.W.3d 492, 496 (Mo. App. E.D. 2011). 
 72. Evans v. Div. of Emp’t Sec., 354 S.W.3d 220, 224 (Mo. App. W.D. 2011). 
 73. Wooden v. Div. of Emp’t Sec., 364 S.W.3d 750, 753-754 (Mo. App.      
W.D. 2012). 
 74. St. John’s Mercy Health Sys. v. Div. of Emp’t Sec., 273 S.W.3d 510, 514 
(Mo. 2009) (en banc) (quoting Mo. Div. of Emp't Sec. v. Labor & Indus. Relations 
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text).
75
  The court has also stated that “the violation of an employer’s reason-
able work rule can constitute misconduct.”
76
  In fact, “[a] single instance of 
intentional disobedience of an employer’s directive can constitute miscon-
duct.”
77
  However, while “a reasonable work rule serves as a relevant factor 
in determining if the behavior at issue is in fact misconduct,” the violation of 
a work rule is not “dispositive proof of misconduct connected with work.”
78
  
Finally, the courts have provided some perspective by pointing out that “there 
is a ‘vast distinction’ between conduct that would justify an employer in ter-
minating an employee and conduct that is misconduct for purposes of deny-
ing unemployment benefits.”
79
  For example, the Court of Appeals has made 
it clear that while “[p]oor workmanship, lack of judgment, or the inability    
to do the job” may result in termination, these qualities “do not disqualify      
a claimant from receiving benefits on the basis of misconduct.”
80
  Therefore, 
an employee’s violation of an employer’s rule, standard, or policy does       
not necessarily constitute misconduct that disqualifies the claimant from  
unemployment benefits. 
An important aspect of the Missouri courts’ discussion of statutory mis-
conduct is the employee’s mental state relating to a given violation.  Specifi-
cally, does proving statutory misconduct always require a showing of willful-
  
 75. See Tolliver v. Friend Tire Co., 342 S.W.3d 428 (Mo. App. E.D. 2011); No-
ah v. Lindbergh Inv., LLC, 320 S.W.3d 212 (Mo. App. E.D. 2010); Williams v. En-
terprise Rent-a-Car Shared Servs., LLC, 297 S.W.3d 139 (Mo. App. E.D. 2009); 
McClelland v. Hogan Pers., LLC, 116 S.W.3d 660 (Mo. App. W.D. 2003). 
 76. Williams, 297 S.W.3d at 144 (citing Moore v. Swisher Mower & Mach. Co., 
49 S.W.3d 731, 740 (Mo. App. E.D. 2001)).  In Williams, the court determined that 
the Commission erred in finding that the employee, a single parent who had been 
terminated in accordance with her employer’s attendance policy, engaged in miscon-
duct by repeatedly arriving late to work.  Id.  
 77. Noah, 320 S.W.3d at 216 (quoting Finner v. Americold Logistics, LLC, 298 
S.W.3d 580, 584 (Mo. App. S.D. 2009)) (internal quotation marks omitted).  In Noah, 
the court found that the employee had engaged in willful misconduct by failing to 
follow his employer’s reasonable directive to report to work (after denying his request 
to take time off).  Id. at 217.  
 78. McClelland, 116 S.W.3d at 665 (quoting Baldor Elec. Co. v. Reasoner, 66 
S.W.3d 130, 134 (Mo. App. E.D. 2001)) (internal quotation marks omitted).  In 
McClelland, the court reversed the Commission’s finding that a terminated employee 
had engaged in misconduct by failing to follow his employer’s inspection policy 
(which had resulted in loss and damage to company property).  Id. at 666. 
 79. Williams, 297 S.W.3d at 144 (citing Pemiscot Cnty. Mem’l Hosp. v. Mo. 
Labor & Indus. Relations Comm’n, 897 S.W.2d 222, 226 (Mo. App. S.D. 1995)). 
 80. Tolliver, 342 S.W.3d at 431 (Mo. App. E.D. 2011) (quoting Hoover v. Cmty. 
Blood Ctr., 153 S.W.3d 9, 13 (Mo. App. W.D. 2005)) (internal quotation marks omit-
ted).  In Tolliver, the court determined that the Commission erred in finding that an 
employee truck driver had engaged in misconduct by speeding on the highway and 
unintentionally damaging the truck when he drove under an overpass that was not 
high enough for the truck to clear.  Id. at 432. 
10
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ness?  Several decisions from the Court of Appeals have required that there 
be “some form of ‘willfulness’ on behalf of the claimant” in order to consti-
tute misconduct.
81
  For instance, the Eastern District has stated that the initial 
requirement for proving misconduct is that the employee must have “in some 
way willfully violate[d] the rules and standards of the employer.”
82
  There-
fore, “[e]ven where negligence is alleged as the basis for misconduct, there 
must be a showing of willful intent.”
83
  That exact quotation (from Duncan v. 
Accent Marketing, LLC) was recited by the Eastern District’s discussion of 
the Fendler situation, quoting Duncan again later to add that a claimant can-
not properly be found to have engaged in misconduct “[w]ithout evidence 
that the claimant deliberately or purposefully erred.”
84
  Therefore, by equat-
ing “willful intent,” deliberation, and purposefulness, the Duncan understand-
ing of “willfulness” allows other cases that do not explicitly use the term 
“willful” to be read in a way that requires misconduct to be proven by a 
showing of “willfulness.”  For instance, one case stated that all four types of 
statutory “misconduct” require a finding of “culpable intent” on the part of 
the employee,
85
 adding that section 288.030.1(23) can only be satisfied if the 
employer presents evidence “that the employee deliberately or purposefully 
erred.”
86
  Under Duncan, this last standard could effectively be considered a 
de facto willfulness requirement. 
However, at other times, the Court of Appeals has not required a show-
ing of “willfulness” to prove misconduct.  Juxtaposing “intent” and “negli-
gence,” the Western District has stated that proving misconduct requires “a 
finding of some intent on the part of the discharged employee or repeated 
negligent acts amounting to culpable conduct.”
87
  Distinguishing between 
  
 81. See Bolden v. Cura, Inc., 350 S.W.3d 878, 881 (Mo. App. E.D. 2011); 
Brinker v. N & R of Jonesburg, Inc., 350 S.W.3d 874, 877 (Mo. App. E.D. 2011); 
Fendler v. Hudson Servs., No. ED 95903, 2011 WL 4790628, at *2 (Mo. App. E.D. 
Oct. 11, 2011), transferred to 370 S.W.3d 585 (Mo. 2012) (en banc); Scrivener Oil 
Co. v. Crider, 304 S.W.3d 261, 268 (Mo. App. S.D. 2010) (quoting Silman v. Sim-
mons’ Grocery & Hardware, Inc., 204 S.W.3d 754, 756 (Mo. App. S.D. 2006)) (inter-
nal quotation marks omitted); Duncan v. Accent Mktg., LLC, 328 S.W.3d 488, 492 
(Mo. App. E.D. 2010); Wieland v. St. Anthony’s Med. Ctr., 294 S.W.3d 77, 79 (Mo. 
App. E.D. 2009); Frisella v. Deuster Elec., Inc., 269 S.W.3d 895, 899 (Mo. App. E.D. 
2008); Dobberstein v. Charter Commc’ns, Inc., 241 S.W.3d 849, 852 (Mo. App. E.D. 
2007); Murphy v. Aaron’s Auto. Prods., 232 S.W.3d 616, 622 (Mo. App. S.D. 2007); 
White v. Wackenhut Corp., 208 S.W.3d 916, 918 (Mo. App. E.D. 2006). 
 82. Wieland, 294 S.W.3d at 79 (citing White, 208 S.W.3d at 918). 
 83. Duncan, 328 S.W.3d at 492 (citing Wieland, 294 S.W. 3d at 79). 
 84. Fendler, 2011 WL 4790628, at *2 (quoting Duncan, 328 S.W. 3d at 492). 
 85. Wooden v. Div. of Emp’t Sec., 364 S.W.3d 750, 753 (Mo. App. W.D. 2012) 
(citing Bostic v. Spherion Atl. Workforce, 216 S.W.3d 723, 725 (Mo. App.          
W.D. 2007)). 
 86. Id. (citing Duncan, 328 S.W. 3d at 492). 
 87. Harris v. Div. of Emp’t Sec., 350 S.W.3d 35, 42 (Mo. App. W.D. 2011) 
(emphasis added) (quoting Bostic, 216 S.W.3d at 725). 
11
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“willfulness” and “knowledge,” the Southern District has stated that an em-
ployer may prove misconduct by showing that “the claimant willfully violat-
ed the rules or standards of the employer or that the claimant knowingly acted 
against the employer’s interest.”
88
  Further, other cases have discussed and 
evaluated an employee’s conduct in terms of willfulness without expressly 
stating that willfulness is required to prove misconduct.
89
  In Fendler, the 
Supreme Court of Missouri relied heavily on these two previously-cited cas-




Related to the question of whether willfulness is required is the question 
of what “willful” even means in this context.  A few Missouri Court of     
Appeals decisions have tried to answer that question.  Both the Southern and 
Western Districts have defined the term “willful” as “proceeding from a   
conscious motion of the will; voluntary; knowingly, deliberate; intending    
the result which actually comes to pass; designed; intentional; purposeful;  
not accidental or involuntary.”
91
  However, the use of this definition has not 
been widespread.   
It is within this uncertain legal context of definitional mental states that 
the Supreme Court of Missouri handed down the Fendler decision.  Instead of 
clearing things up, the Court established a poorly-defined distinction within 
the statutory definition of misconduct that could potentially lead to a broader 
practical application of misconduct analysis. 
IV. INSTANT DECISION 
A. Majority  
In Fendler, the Supreme Court of Missouri affirmed the Commission’s 
decision to deny Carol Fendler’s claim for unemployment benefits.
92
  Specif-
ically, the Court found that competent and substantial evidence existed to 
support the Commission’s determination that Fendler had engaged in mis-
conduct.
93
  Focusing on this notion of statutory “misconduct,” the Court re-
  
 88. Freeman v. Gary Glass & Mirror, LLC, 276 S.W.3d 388, 391 (Mo. App. S.D. 
2009) (emphasis added) (citing Croy v. Div. of Emp’t Sec., 187 S.W.3d 888, 892 
(Mo. App. S.D. 2006)). 
 89. See Moore v. Swisher Mower & Mach. Co., 49 S.W.3d 731, 739-40 (Mo. 
App. E.D. 2001).  
 90. See infra notes 108-116 and accompanying text. 
 91. Butrick v. Peterbilt of Springfield, Inc., 373 S.W.3d 473, 479 (Mo. App. S.D. 
2012) (quoting Lightwine v. Republic R-III Sch. Dist., 339 S.W. 585, 590 (Mo. App. 
S.D. 2011)) (internal quotation marks omitted); McClelland v. Hogan Pers., LLC, 116 
S.W.3d 660, 666 (Mo. App. W.D. 2003) (quoting Black’s Law Dictionary 1599 (6th 
ed. 1990)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 92. Fendler v. Hudson Servs., 370 S.W.3d 585, 591 (Mo. 2012) (en banc).  
 93. Id. 
12
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jected Fendler’s negligence arguments, concluding: (1) negligence (without 
willfulness) can constitute misconduct, and (2) Fendler’s conduct constituted 
willful disregard of her employer’s rule.
94
   
After reviewing the facts and standard of review, Judge Laura Denvir 
Stith began the majority’s analysis by making some introductory remarks 
regarding both unemployment insurance and misconduct.
95
  The Court stated 
that “[t]he purpose of unemployment benefits is to provide financial assis-
tance to people who are unemployed through no fault of their own.”
96
  The 
Court then quoted Missouri’s definition of misconduct as it relates to work.
97
  
Following these introductory statements, the Court addressed Fendler’s ar-
gument that: (1) the record only supports a finding that she acted negligently 
(not that she acted willfully), and (2) “negligence cannot support a finding of 
misconduct” (only willful conduct).
98
  The Court stated that her argument 
failed for two reasons.
99
 
In rejecting Fendler’s argument, the Court first addressed the notion  
that negligence cannot support a finding of misconduct and that a showing   
of willfulness is required.
100
  The Court began its rejection of Fendler’s prop-
osition by stating, “[E]ven had the record not supported the commission’s 
finding that Ms. Fendler’s conduct was willful, that would not preclude          
a finding of misconduct.”
101
  More specifically, the Court stated that the statu-
tory definition of “misconduct” includes more than “just a willful violation of 
employer’s rules.”
102
  While conceding that “simple negligence” never consti-
tutes misconduct,
103
 the Court emphasized the existence of the negligence 
prong in section 288.030.1(23), reciting the clause in its entirety.
104
  Immedi-
ately following, the Court concluded, “Therefore, an employee may engage in 
misconduct under the statute by repeatedly choosing to act in what amounts 




The Court then addressed Fendler’s claim that the record did not support 
a finding that she behaved willfully (only that she behaved negligently).
106
  In 
rejecting this position, the Court found that the record supported the Commis-
  
 94. Id. at 589, 590-91. 
 95. Id. at 589. 
 96. Id. (citing MO. REV. STAT. § 288.020 (2000)). 
 97. Id. (quoting § 288.030 (Supp. 2005)). 
 98. Id. at 589. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. (citing Yellow Freight Sys. v. Thomas, 987 S.W.2d 1, 4 (Mo. App.    
W.D. 1998)). 
 104. Id. at 589 (quoting MO. REV. STAT.  § 288.030.1(23) (Supp. 2005)). 
 105. Id. at 589-90. 
 106. Id. at 590. 
13
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sion’s determination that Fendler’s repeated failure to follow Meister’s ex-
plicit instructions “[took] her conduct outside the realm of mere mistakes or 
poor work performance and into the realm of insubordination.”
107
  Hearken-
ing back to the Commission’s findings, the Court stated that “an employee’s 
repeated violation of a known, understood and reasonable work rule, in and of 
itself, can provide competent and substantial evidence that the employee will-
fully or deliberately violated the rule.”
108
  To exemplify this rule, the Court 
examined two previously-mentioned “misconduct” cases decided by the Mis-
souri Court of Appeals in recent years, Freeman and Moore.
109
 
In Freeman, the Court noted, the employee was terminated based on his 
work performance, which had declined abruptly after three years of satisfac-
tory performance.
110
  The Court noted that this decline in performance in-
cluded improperly installing doors on two separate occasions, turning away a 
job that the company could have performed, failing to double check the 
measurements of a mirror (which he had been instructed to do by his supervi-
sor), and recommending a product to a customer after he had been told not to 
do so.
111
  The Court concluded its discussion of Freeman by adding that the 
Court of Appeals, in finding that competent and substantial evidence existed 
to support the Commission’s determination that Freeman had deliberately 
violated the employer’s instructions, stated that a “repeated failure to follow 
the Employer’s specific instructions, without any explanation . . . speaks just 
as loudly about the willfulness of Claimant’s actions as [does a] . . . verbal 
refusal [to follow instructions].”
112
 
In Moore, as the Supreme Court pointed out, the employee was termi-
nated after failing to contact his employer and explain his absence from work 
for three consecutive days.
113
  In fact, the Court added, the employee had 
been arrested for assault and held in jail for those three days.
114
  The employ-
er maintained an absentee policy that required employees to call in each day 
if they were going to miss work, and it was the employee’s failure to comply 
with this policy, not the arrest itself, that resulted in his termination.
115
  The 
Court emphasized that despite the employee’s argument that his failure to call 
was simply bad judgment, the Court of Appeals held that his knowledge of 





 107. Id. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. 
 112. Id. (quoting Freeman v. Gary Glass & Mirror, LLC, 276 S.W.3d 388, 393 
(Mo. App. S.D. 2009)). 
 113. Id.  
 114. Id.  
 115. Id.  
 116. Id.  
14
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Applying its understanding of Freeman and Moore’s discussion of mis-
conduct, the Court determined that Fendler willfully disregarded her employ-
er’s instructions.
117
  In fact, the Court explicitly stated that the facts support-
ing a finding of willful disregard were stronger in Fendler’s situation than 
they had been in either the Freeman or Moore cases.
118
  In reaching that con-
clusion, the Court pointed out that Fendler failed to comply with Meister’s 
instructions on at least eleven separate occasions after having received a third 
formal warning.
119
  Further, the Court emphasized Fendler’s admissions that: 
(1) she knew that Meister wanted her to record the exact start and end times 
of the janitorial employee’s shifts; (2) she knew how to comply with Meis-
ter’s instructions; and (3) she would have complied with Meister’s instruc-
tions if she had known that her job was in jeopardy.
120
  Therefore, the majori-
ty concluded, the facts proved that Fendler’s failure to follow Meister’s in-
structions “was not the result of negligence or poor judgment but a deliberate 




In his dissent, Judge Richard Teitelman, like the Eastern District, ex-
pressed disagreement with the Commission’s finding of misconduct.
122
  By 
strictly construing the statutory definition of misconduct “against the disal-
lowance of benefits,” Teitelman found that Fendler’s behavior only estab-
lished negligence.
123
  Specifically, Teitelman stated that Fendler’s actions did 
not constitute misconduct because the evidence failed to show that her behav-
ior established deliberate disregard of her employer’s interests.
124
   
After stating that the determination of work-related misconduct is a 
question of law and that the Court was not bound by the Commission’s legal 
conclusions or application of law to facts, Teitelman cited case law and a 
relevant statute to propose his preferred method of interpreting MESL.
125
  
Teitelman stated that a determination of whether misconduct exists should be 
guided by the Missouri legislature’s “mandate” that MESL “shall be liberally 
construed to accomplish its purpose to promote employment security . . . by 




 117. Id. at 590-91. 
 118. Id. at 590. 
 119. Id. at 590-91. 
 120. Id. at 591. 
 121. Id.  
 122. Id. at 592 (Teitelman, J., dissenting). 
 123. Id. at 591-92. 
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. at 591. 
 126. Id. (quoting MO. REV. STAT. § 288.020 (2000)). 
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Therefore, “Disqualifying provisions are construed strictly against the disal-
lowance of benefits.”
127
   
In applying a strict construction of the word “misconduct,” Teitelman 
concluded that the Commission erred in finding that Fendler engaged in mis-
conduct and in denying her claim for unemployment benefits.
128
  While con-
ceding that Fendler did indeed fail to record start and end times as instructed, 
Teitelman found no evidence that directly supported a determination that 
Fendler acted willfully as opposed to negligently.
129
  Specifically, Teitelman 
characterized the determination of willfulness as “drawing a disputed infer-
ence in favor of the employer.”
130
  Although he admitted that violating “an 
employer’s reasonable work rule can constitute misconduct,” Teitelman em-
phasized that there is a “vast distinction” between the type of conduct that 
justifies the termination of an employee and the type of conduct that consti-
tutes misconduct for the purposes of denying unemployment insurance.
131
  
Therefore, Teitelman concluded, Fendler’s failure to comply with Hudson’s 
verification process “does not necessarily provide a basis for disqualifying 
her from receiving unemployment benefits.”
132
  In conclusion, Teitelman 
stated that he would strictly construe MESL as “required” by section 
288.020.2, holding that the facts merely established negligence and that the 
Commission erred in determining that Fendler engaged in “willful miscon-
duct” that disqualified her from receiving unemployment benefits.
133
 
The majority of the Supreme Court of Missouri held that because 
Fendler knew her employer’s rule and how to comply with it, violated         
the rule on eleven different occasions after receiving three warnings, and 
admitted that she would have complied had she known that her job was in 
danger, competent and substantial evidence existed to support the Commis-
sion’s conclusion that Fendler engaged in misconduct by deliberately and 





 127. Id. (quoting St. John’s Mercy Health Sys. v. Div. of Emp’t Sec., 273 S.W.3d 
510, 514 (Mo. 2009) (en banc)). 
 128. Id. at 591.  
 129. Id. at 591-92. 
 130. Id. at 592. 
 131. Id. (quoting Williams v. Enter. Rent-A-Car Shared Servs., 297 S.W.3d 139, 
144 (Mo. App. E.D. 2009) (citing Moore v. Swisher Mower & Mach. Co., 49 S.W.3d 
731, 740 (Mo. App. E.D. 2001); Pemiscot Cnty. Mem. Hosp. v. Mo. Labor & Indus. 
Relations Comm'n, 897 S.W.2d 222, 226 (Mo. App. S.D. 1995))). 
 132. Id. at 592.  In support of this proposition, Teitelman points to Duncan and 
Frisella, cases in which an employee’s failure to follow instructions or heed repeated 
warnings did not establish misconduct.  Id.  
 133. Id. 
 134. Id. at 590-91. 
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V. COMMENT 
Although the Supreme Court of Missouri has previously heard cases re-
lating to “misconduct connected with work” in the context of unemployment 
benefits,
135
 Fendler v. Hudson Services provides the Supreme Court’s first 
thorough discussion of the statutory definition of misconduct since its codifi-
cation in section 288.030.1(23).
136
  In taking the opportunity to interpret this 
specific provision, the Court attempted to clarify the statute’s mental state 
requirements.  The result was a broadening of misconduct analysis, and the 
potential long-term effects of this expansion bring to light important compet-
ing policy considerations. 
A. The Mental States of Misconduct 
Culpable mental states play an important role in determining whether an 
employee has engaged in statutory “misconduct.”
137
  However, for being such 
determinative factors, the distinctions between these mental state standards 
are unclear.  Specifically, section 288.030.1(23) uses the terms “willful,” 
“deliberate,” and “negligence in such degree or recurrence as to manifest 
culpability [or] wrongful intent.”
138
  How distinct are these standards?  To a 
certain extent, can the latter two be equated with some level of willfulness?  
As mentioned above, the Missouri Court of Appeals has already arguably 
equated “willfulness” and “deliberateness” to some extent.
139
  Further, while 
“simple negligence” is admittedly different than “intent,” the type of negli-
gence that manifests “wrongful intent” as described in the statute sounds ra-
  
 135. See, e.g., M.F.A. Milling Co. v. Unemp’t Comp. Comm’n, 169 S.W.2d 929, 
930 (Mo. 1943) (“The sole question is whether the claimant was discharged for ‘mis-
conduct connected with his work’ and thereby disqualified from receiving unem-
ployment benefits.”).  Despite having a similar issue on appeal, this case was decided 
before the modern definition of “misconduct” was codified in section 288.030 and 
therefore does not contain a discussion of the four-pronged definition found discussed 
in Fendler.  See id.  
 136. The modern definition of “misconduct” was first codified in section 
288.030.1 in 2005 under subsection 24.  H.B. 1268, 92nd Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. 
Sess.  (Mo. 2004).  In 2006, section 288.030 was amended, and the definition now 
falls under subsection 23.  H.B. 1456, 93d Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2006).  
In 2007, after the definition’s codification, the Supreme Court of Missouri ruled on a 
determination by the Commission that an employee had engaged in misconduct and 
was disqualified from unemployment benefits; however, in affirming the Commis-
sion’s decision, the Court did not provide any analysis or discussion of statutory mis-
conduct, stating that “[a]n opinion would have no precedential value.”  Williams v. 
Cent. Mo. Pizza, Inc., 225 S.W.3d 431, 431 (Mo. 2007) (en banc). 
 137. See MO. REV. STAT. § 288.030.1(23) (Supp. 2011). 
 138. Id.  
 139. See supra notes 83-86 and accompanying text. 
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ther willful.  Why would this distinction be made?  The point is this: on its 
own, the statute can be confusing as to mental states.
140
 
Prior to Fendler, Missouri case law had not provided a uniform interpre-
tation of this statute.  As stated above, while several Court of Appeals      





 and further, no consensus on the exact meaning of “willful-
ness” had emerged.
143
  After having stayed silent on the matter for so long, 
the Supreme Court of Missouri had an opportunity to clarify what these men-
tal state standards meant and to set the record straight on the requirements for 
finding misconduct.   
In Fendler, the Supreme Court determined that a finding of willfulness 
was not required to prove misconduct.
144
  The Court clearly stated that   
“even had the record not supported the commission’s finding that Ms. 
Fendler’s conduct was willful, that would not preclude a finding of miscon-
duct.”
145
  By then emphasizing the negligence prong of section 
288.030.1(23), the Court made an express distinction between “willfulness” 
and the type of “negligence” that manifests culpability.
146
  In making this 
distinction, the Court refused to require a showing of willfulness, finding that 
negligence (without willfulness) can indeed support a finding of miscon-
duct.
147
  However, in coming to this decision, the Court failed to recognize or 
mention any of the numerous Court of Appeals decisions
148
 that had come to 
the opposite conclusion. 
By making this type of statutory “negligence” separate and distinct from 
“willfulness,” the Court further muddied the waters of misconduct mental 
states.  Specifically, the difference between “simple negligence” (which does 
not constitute misconduct)
149
 and the statutory prong of “negligence” (which 
does constitute misconduct), neither of which requires “willfulness,” is now 
  
 140. For the remainder of the Note (unless otherwise noted), any use of the term 
“negligence” refers to the type of statutory negligence that constitutes “misconduct” 
under section 288.030.1(23). 
 141. See supra note 80 and accompanying text. 
 142. See supra notes 86-89 and accompanying text.  
 143. Duncan seemed to equate willfulness with intent and deliberation.  See supra 
notes 80-81 and accompanying text.  However, other cases have used a seemingly 
over-inclusive definition (from Black’s Law Dictionary) that includes the terms 
“knowingly,” “deliberate,” “intentional,” and “purposeful” and the phrase “not acci-
dental or involuntary.”  See supra note 88 and accompanying text. 
 144. Fendler v. Hudson Servs., 370 S.W.3d 585, 589 (Mo. 2012) (en banc). 
 145. Id. 
 146. Id. at 589-90. 
 147. See id.  
 148. See supra note 80.  
 149. See supra note 102 and accompanying text. 
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unclear.
150
  In an attempt to explain what type of behavior may fall under the 
statute’s “negligence” prong, the Court stated, “[A]n employee may engage in 
misconduct under the statute by repeatedly choosing to act in what amounts 
to reckless disregard of the employer’s rules or the employee’s duties or obli-
gations.”
151
  In other words, the Court attempted to clarify this statutory “neg-
ligence” standard by throwing another mental state into the mix: reckless-
ness.
152
  Under this interpretation, a single prong of section 288.030.1(23) 
now involves three mental states: “negligence,” “intent,” and “recklessness.”  
Therefore, determining whether an employee’s negligent conduct establishes 
misconduct is now more confusing than ever. 
Although the Supreme Court established that “willfulness” and statutory 
“negligence” are separate and distinct, the Court failed to provide a clear 
practical understanding of what “willfulness” means and how it is different 
from statutory “negligence.”  As mentioned above, the Court stated that “re-
peatedly choosing to act” in a way that recklessly disregards an employer’s 
rules satisfies the “negligence” prong.
153
  However, in determining that 
Fendler’s behavior was “willful,” the Court later stated that Fendler’s failure 
to follow Meister’s instructions “was not the result of negligence or poor 
judgment but a deliberate choice to disregard the instructions.”
154
  Both of 
these quotations emphasize Fendler’s choice.  Is the only difference between 
“willfulness” and statutory “negligence” the distinction between a deliberate 
choice and a choice amounting to recklessness?  By using the term “deliber-
ate” in the context of “willfulness,” the Court seems to find some common 
ground with Duncan, but in any case, a distinction based on these two kinds 
of choices seems to be too obscure.  To a certain extent, every choice is de-
liberate; it would be hard to differentiate between a choice that amounts to a 
reckless disregard of a rule and a deliberate choice to break a rule.  Either 
way, the employee is choosing to break a rule.  Although employers will 
jump at the chance to use the term “reckless” and differentiate it from “will-
fulness” in an effort to prove misconduct,
155
 the practical distinction is not 
very clear.  Therefore, this seems to be a failed attempt to clearly explain 
“willfulness” as it differs from statutory “negligence.”  The only thing that 
can be said with certainty after Fendler is that “negligence in such degree or 
recurrence as to manifest culpability, wrongful intent or evil design, or show 
an intentional and substantial disregard of the employer’s interest or of the 
employee’s duties and obligations to the employer” does not fall under the 
  
 150. Comparatively, the difference between these two concepts would be clearer 
if proving “misconduct” (including under the “negligence” prong) required a showing 
of “willfulness.” 
 151. Fendler, 370 S.W.3d at 589-90. 
 152. Missouri’s criminal code describes recklessness as “conscious disregard.”  
MO. REV. STAT. § 562.016.4 (Supp. 2009). 
 153. Fendler, 370 S.W.3d at 589-90. 
 154. Id. at 590-91. 
 155. See infra note 158. 
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statutory understanding of “willful.”
156
  In sum, while Fendler does provide 
an example of “willful” behavior, the Court’s own analysis merely provides 
an obscure distinction between the terms “willful” and statutory “negligence,” 
and the Court’s failure to discuss the Court of Appeals’ past uses of “willful” 
leaves the exact meaning of the term unclear. 
By distinguishing between “willfulness” and “negligence” in this con-
text, stating that a finding of misconduct need not include a finding of “will-
fulness,” and blurring the line between “simple negligence” and the statutory 
negligence prong, the Fendler decision has potentially broadened the defini-
tion of misconduct.
157
  A broadened definition could make it more difficult 
for unemployed individuals to qualify for unemployment benefits and there-
fore, over time, reduce the overall number of individuals that receive unem-
ployment insurance (UI).  Although, as mentioned above, the specific, practi-
cal distinction between these particular forms of statutory “willfulness” and 
“negligence” remains unclear, the most obvious takeaway from Fendler for 
employers seems to be that negligence without willfulness (which can be 
reduced to the term “recklessness”)
158
 can establish misconduct.  In future 
cases, employers and the DES will be able to emphasize the Supreme Court 
of Missouri’s determination that employee misconduct can be proven without 
a showing of willfulness.  In fact, this has already occurred.
159
  It logically 
follows that, if the Missouri Court of Appeals can no longer require a show-
ing of willfulness, it is possible that certain non-willful forms of negligence 
that would not have been found to constitute misconduct before Fendler will 
now in fact be found to establish misconduct, disqualifying many future 
  
 156. See supra notes 144-147 and accompanying text. 
 157. See Brief of Respondent, Mo. Dept. of Labor and Indus. Relations, Div. of 
Emp’t Sec., Corbin v. Alliance Fire Prot., LLC, 391 S.W.3d 513 (Mo. App. W.D. 
2013) (No. WD74652), 2012 WL 3931052, at *21 (“The Missouri Supreme Court has 
now expanded the analysis to be used in determining whether a claimant’s actions 
amount to misconduct under the Missouri Employment Security Law.”). 
 158. See Brief of Respondent Div. of Emp’t Sec., Rankin v. Laclede Gas Co., 388 
S.W.3d 599 (Mo. App. E.D. 2012) (No. ED98410), 2012 WL 4372415, at *14-15 
(stating that a finding of misconduct requires proof that the employee willfully violat-
ed the employer’s rules or was reckless under the negligence prong of section 
288.030.1(23)); Brief of Respondent Div. of Emp’t Sec., Nunn v. Div. of Emp’t Sec., 
388 S.W.3d 644 (Mo. App. W.D. 2013) (No. WD75213), 2012 WL 5248671, at *10; 
Brief of Respondent, supra note 157, at *21 (emphasis added) (citing Fendler, 370 
S.W.3d at 589-90) (“[W]ork-related misconduct must involve some form of willful-
ness or recklessness for the claimant to be disqualified.”).  The brief goes on to recite 
the “reckless choice” quotation from Fendler.  Id. at *22. 
 159. See Brief of Respondent, supra note 157, at *21; Brief of Respondent, Sunny 
Hill, Inc., Harris v. Sunny Hill, Inc., 387 S.W.3d 409 (Mo. App. E.D. 2012) (No. ED 
98226), 2012 WL 4370221, at *19 (“As the Supreme Court of Missouri has recently 
clarified, willfulness or intentional conduct is not necessarily a prerequisite for a find-
ing of misconduct.”). 
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claimants from unemployment benefits.
160
  Only time will tell if the Fendler 
decision will dramatically increase the number of unemployed individuals 
who will be found to have engaged in misconduct, thereby reducing the num-
ber of individuals that receive unemployment compensation.  The Supreme 




In summary, the Fendler decision made it clear that proving misconduct 
does not require a showing of “willfulness.”
162
  By refusing to require “will-
fulness” and distinguishing between “willfulness” and statutory “negligence,” 
the Supreme Court blurred the line between “simple negligence” and the type 
of “negligence” that constitutes misconduct under the statutory “negligence” 
prong.
163
  The Court does provide “recklessness” as a guiding principle for 
the “negligence” prong, but the introduction of this mental state term is a 
complicating factor in itself.  Additionally, the Court failed to clearly explain 
its obscure and poorly-defined distinction between “willfulness” and statutory 
“negligence,” both of which seem to involve choice.  All of these factors 
could result in a broadened definition of “misconduct,” which may make it 
harder for employees to qualify for unemployment compensation in the future 
and could eventually reduce the overall number of individuals who receive 
these benefits. 
B. Policy Considerations  
If the Fendler decision has the overall effect of excluding many individ-
uals from receiving unemployment insurance and reducing the number of 
individuals who receive such benefits, this effect would be relevant to two 
competing policy considerations stemming from the realm of unemployment 
compensation. 
  
 160. After all, many of the appellate court decisions that required a showing of 
willfulness (cited supra note 81) ended up holding that the employee’s behavior did 
not establish misconduct that disqualified them from benefits or that the commission 
had erred in finding misconduct.  See, e.g., Scrivener Oil Co. v. Crider, 304 S.W.3d 
261, 271 (Mo. App. S.D. 2010); Duncan v. Accent Mktg., LLC, 328 S.W.3d 488, 493 
(Mo. App. E.D. 2010).  Conversely, two cases cited in this Note as examples of deci-
sions that did not explicitly require a showing of willfulness (Freeman and Moore) 
found the claimant’s behavior to constitute misconduct.  See Freeman v. Gary Glass 
& Mirror, LLC, 276 S.W.3d 388, 393 (Mo. App. S.D. 2009); Moore v. Swisher 
Mower & Mach. Co., 49 S.W.3d 731, 740 (Mo. App. E.D. 2001).  Interestingly 
enough, the Fendler decision, in finding that Fendler’s committed misconduct, relied 
heavily on both of those cases.  Fendler, 370 S.W.3d at 590. 
 161. Brown v. Frankcrum 1, Inc., 370 S.W.3d 932, 932 (Mo. App. E.D. 2012) 
(“In light of the Supreme Court’s recent holding in Fendler . . . we cannot find that 
the Commission erred in finding that Claimant was discharged for conduct connected 
with his work.  An extended opinion would have no precedential value.”). 
 162. Fendler, 370 S.W.3d at 589-90. 
 163. See id. 
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First, this “Fendler effect” could affect Missouri’s UI trust fund, which 
is currently running at an overall deficit of over $500 million.
164
  The national 
recession caused a significant increase in Missouri’s unemployment rate, and 
these economic factors put a substantial strain on the state’s UI trust fund.
165
  
Due to similar conditions, over thirty states began borrowing money from the 
federal UI trust fund to cover the payment of state unemployment benefits, 
and Missouri began to do so in February of 2009.
166
  By September 2010, 
Missouri owed the federal trust fund over $722 million.
167
  Although this 
figure has decreased over the last few years, the remaining debt will cause 
Missouri employers to suffer a decrease in their Federal Unemployment Tax 
Act (FUTA) tax credits.
168
  Related to this massive debt is the problem of 
false and fraudulent claims for unemployment benefits.  Because of almost 
15,000 known fraudulent claims, Missouri’s DES paid more than $20 million 





 attempted to address and might have solved this debt prob-
lem.
171
  This proposed legislation redefined misconduct to include the viola-
  
 164. Missouri Employers Face Higher Taxes for Unemployment Insurance, MO. 
CHAMBER COM. & INDUS., http://www.mochamber.com/mx/hm.asp?id=083112ui (last 
visited Sep. 3, 2013) [hereinafter MO. CHAMBER COM. & INDUS.]; Missouri Unem-
ployment Trust Fund Projection, MO. DEP’T LAB. & INDUS. REL., (May 15, 2012), 
http://labor.mo.gov/DES/Forms/MOBFM2012Q1.pdf.  On their data and statistics 
page, the Missouri Department of Labor and Industrial Relations reports the UI trust 
fund balance separately from the amount owed to the federal government from Title 
XII loans.  Data and Statistics, supra note 8.  As of September 26, 2012, the trust 
fund’s “balance” was $36,567,114.85 and the amount of Title XII loans 
$569,252,812.84 (creating the overall deficit of over $500 million).  Id.  
 165. Amy Blouin & Tom Kruckemeyer, State Unemployment Insurance Trust 
Fund Faces Major Deficit, MO. BUDGET PROJECT 1 (Sept. 28, 2010), 
http://www.mobudget.org/files/UI%20Trust%20Fund%20Faces%20Deficit%20Augu
st%202010.pdf. 
 166. Id. at 2.  Title XII allows this borrowing by states from the federal unem-
ployment account.  42 U.S.C. 1321(a)(1) (2012).  
 167. Blouin & Kruckmeyer, supra note 165, at 1.  
 168. MO. CHAMBER COM. & INDUS., supra note 164.  In addition to their contribu-
tions to the state UI system, employers must pay a FUTA tax each year that contrib-
utes to the federal UI trust fund.  Blouin & Kruckmeyer, supra note 165, at 3.  The 
federal government gives FUTA tax credits to employers in states that have not bor-
rowed from the federal UI trust fund and in states that are current on their loan pay-
ments.  Id.  These credits are reduced when a state does not keep up with its loan 
payments.  Id.; MO. CHAMBER COM. & INDUS., supra note 164.   
 169. MO. CHAMBER OF COM. & INDUS., supra note 164.  Examples of fraudulent 
claims include claims by individuals who are not actively searching for a job, individ-
uals who were fired for misconduct or quit their job voluntarily, or individuals that 
continue to file claims even though they have a new job.  Id.  Another common scam 
is that convicted criminals have someone else file claims for them while they are in 
prison.  Id.  Further, claims are sometimes filed on behalf of deceased individuals.  Id. 
 170. See supra notes 66-68 and accompanying text. 
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tion of any rule that the employee knew or should have known about.
172
  Un-
der such a rule analysis of the Fendler situation and other similar cases would 
be quite simple.  Further, the bill purports to deny unemployment benefits to 
individuals “regardless of whether the misconduct occurs at the workplace or 
during work hours.”
173
  By significantly broadening the definition of statutory 
misconduct (resulting in an increase in disqualifications due to misconduct), 
SB 816 could have, over time, resulted in a significant reduction in the 
amount of unemployment benefits being paid by the state of Missouri.  This 
effect could have aided the reduction of Missouri’s UI trust fund debt.  How-




Although it clearly does not define misconduct as broadly as SB 816, 
the Fendler decision could potentially have similar effects, but on a smaller 
scale.  If employers continue to emphasize the Supreme Court’s determina-
tion that a showing of “willfulness” is unnecessary to find misconduct, and if 
the Court’s emphasis on the “negligence” prong leads the Court of Appeals to 
find more cases of misconduct than they would have otherwise (leading to a 
reduction in the number of individuals that qualify for UI), then the long-term 
use of Fendler analysis could have a significant effect on the financial health 
of Missouri’s UI trust fund.  Therefore, the Fendler decision could be seen 
primarily as a partial solution to Missouri’s UI system’s debt problem and as 
form of relief from the tax burdens of Missouri’s employers. 
The second policy consideration is how this “Fendler effect” relates to 
the purposes of the unemployment benefit system.  The system was put in 
place to avoid the negative effects that economic insecurity has on the 
“health, morals, and welfare of the people.”
175
  Further, unemployment bene-
fits are meant to help “maintain the economy of the state during periods of 
economic downturn by helping preserve the level of consumer purchasing 
power.”
176
  This “safety net” of unemployment insurance arguably allows 
unemployed individuals “to avoid impoverishment while searching for other 
meaningful employment” and can be “held out as an economic stabilizer” that 
ensures the non-existence of a “permanent underclass” of needy, temporarily 
unemployed individuals.
177
  Under this line of thinking, a decline in the avail-
ability of unemployment benefits would allow economic insecurity to harm 
the “health, morals, and welfare” of an increased portion of the public.  Fur-
ther, according to the DES, a decrease in the number of unemployed individ-
uals receiving UI could have a negative impact on the state’s overall economy 
  
 171. See MO. CHAMBER OF COM. & INDUS., supra note 164.   
 172. S.B. 816, 96th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2012).  
 173. Id.   
 174. MO. CHAMBER OF COM. & INDUS., supra note 164.   
 175. MO. REV. STAT. § 288.020.1 (2000).  
 176. About the Division of Employment Security, supra note 16. 
 177. Laramore, supra note 1, at 1469. 
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if “consumer purchasing power” is not preserved.
178
  Therefore, if Fendler 
has this proposed effect on the realm of unemployment benefits, the decision 
could alternatively be seen primarily as a frustration of the important purpos-
es of the unemployment benefit system.   
So, how should the Fendler decision be viewed?  Which set of problems 
is more pressing?  Such questions are difficult, and determining the answers 
requires practical experience and economic expertise beyond that of this au-
thor.  However, this discussion could be moot if the decision fails to have any 
significant impact on how broadly the Missouri Court of Appeals applies the 
Fendler understanding of “misconduct.”  Nevertheless, regardless of whether 
one sees Fendler as a potential problem or solution, one must not lose sight of 
the fact that the stated purpose of Missouri’s UI system is to set aside funds in 
order to provide benefits to individuals who are unemployed “through no 




Fendler v. Hudson Services illustrates the intricate use of mental state 
standards within the current definitional landscape of the phrase “misconduct 
connected with work” as it relates to unemployment benefits.  By refusing to 
require that an employee’s conduct be “willful” in order to constitute “mis-
conduct” and emphasizing an unclear distinction between the “negligence” 
(or “recklessness”) prong and “willfulness,” the Supreme Court of Missouri 
attempted to clarify the separate elements of the statutory definition of “mis-
conduct.”  However, as a result, the Court not only made mental state matters 
more confusing with a poor distinction, but it also potentially broadened the 
type of behavior that establishes “misconduct.”  This last potential result 
could have the overall effect of reducing the percentage of claimants that 
qualify for unemployment benefits. 
This case represents the difficulty of interpreting and applying the statu-
tory definition of a term as vague and relative as “misconduct.”  However, 
regardless of the difficulty, the long-term effects of Fendler are relevant to 
both social and economic public policy concerns.  Assuming that Fendler 
does make it harder for claimants to qualify for unemployment benefits, this 
decision can be viewed as a problem or a solution.  From the employer’s 
viewpoint, the “Fendler effect” could help restore Missouri’s UI trust fund to 
solvency.  While SB 816 would have been more aggressive in cutting back on 
UI spending, Fendler is potentially a step in the right direction.  On the other 
hand, Fendler could be seen as a major obstacle to accomplishing some of the 
purposes of MESL.  Perhaps a detailed analysis of the state’s economy, UI 
trust fund, and unemployment rate would provide an informed opinion as to 
which set of concerns are more pressing and how the Fendler decision should 
  
 178. See About the Division of Employment Security, supra note 16. 
 179. § 288.020.1. 
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be viewed, but such analysis is beyond the scope of this Note.  One thing is 
for sure: as employers, claimants, and courts continue to generate and resolve 
disputes over statutory “misconduct,” one must evaluate each situation with 
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